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xxii PREFACE arc modes for composing and dividing essence, which represent significatively the finite or limited whole or the thing of nature. Thus an essence is like a set of ratios, or proportion, for the signs refer to each other and in addition to that which is signaled. It is clear that in the rational order signification possesses an analytic remotion or formal distance from that which is signified. Let, therefore, two orders of reference be posed: i. The horizontal order of reference according to which entia rationis, beings of the conceptual order, refer to each other. These are second intentions in the order of signification and consist of the sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i. e. unless it has unity of form." Met. 1016 b 7. In regard to the analytic separability of the essence: "...and the physicist is concerned only with things whose forms are separable indeed, but do not exist apart from matter. . . . The mode of existence and essence of the separable it is the business of the primary type of philosophy to define." Physics, 194 b 12. "The underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge by an analogy." Physics, 191 a 8. "...and when I speak of substance without matter I mean essence." 1032 b 14. "It is obvious then, . . . what sensible substance is and how it exists one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of these two." 1043 a 26. "...for in everything the essence is identical with the ground of its being." De Anima, 415 b 12. "...form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a 'this'..." De Anima, 412 a 8. In regard to essence, nature and substance: "From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary and strict sense is the essence of things which have in themselves, as such, a source of movement; for the matter is called the nature because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and growing are called nature because they are movements pro- ceeding from this." Met. 1015 a 13. "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication (soil, the categories); for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures." Met. 1017 a 23. "Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition." Met 1030 a 6. See further Met. Z. "It follows then, that 'substance' has two senses: (A) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a 'this* is also separable. . . ." Met. 1017 b 23. Oxford University Press Ed.