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PREFACE xxxvii increment which may or may not accrue in addition to the proper accident of a substance. It is derived from the material or contingent aspect of the matter as a margin of potency. A property, however, is a sort of secondary proper act, just as in man the property of risibility is an act issuing from an appre- hension within the intellect. Whereas properties issue from the proper accidents, contingent accidents do not. Contingent acci- dents may form descriptions, but they cannot signify what a thing is primarily as a nature or mode of substantial unity of this or that grade of perfection. The first intention is a sensation actualized in the potency of sense by the active agency of the sensible body; consequently, it is a sensible substitute of the thing, but to be understood as the substitute of the thing as it is and not as a sign referring to other things. As such it is a potential sign in the order of abstraction. Such intentions are the implicit subject matter of natural science. The second intention, or that by virtue of which what is known is known, is the analogue of the first intention as it is rendered intelligible by the intellect in act, and thus as existing as the essence of the sensible thing freed from all contingent increments of individuation. Further, it is the thing as ultimately analyzed by reflexive intellective acts whereby what is generically implicit in first intentions, and hence in like things, becomes discursively explicit, namely, according to signation by genus, species, difference, property and accident. Since the intellected essence expresses the necessary mode of being whereby the thing must be what it is, and hence dis- tinguishes the basis of generic similitude through specific act, individual difference (the basis of numerical multiplication of the individuals in quantified matter after the kind of a species) must ensue from a condition in addition to the essential mode of being. This condition ensues from accidents which advene