2.4K
CHAPTER ONE BECAUSE indeed we must receive knowledge of the simple from the composite and arrive at what is prior from what is posterior, in order that beginning with the less difficult in- struction may be made more suitably, we should proceed from the meaning of being to the meaning of essence. Therefore one should know, as the Philosopher says in the fifth of the Metaphysics? that being by itself (ens per se) is said to be taken in two modes: in the one mode, that it is divided into ten genera; in the other, that it signifies the truth of propositions. Moreover the difference between these is that in the second mode everything can be called being concerning which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if it posits nothing in the thing (in re}\ by virtue of this mode privations and negations are likewise called beings, for we say that affirmation is the opposite of negation, and that blindness is in the eye. But in the first mode only what posits something in the thing can be called being; consequently, according to the first mode blindness and such are not beings. The name essence, therefore, is not taken from being in the second mode, for in this mode some things are said to have essence which have not being, as is evident in privations, gut essence is taken from being only in the first mode; whence the Commentator says in the same place that 4 "being in the first mode is said to be what signifies the essence of the thing." And because, as has been said, being in this mode is divided into ten genera, 8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A> io j 7 a 22-35; a ^ s Met, E, b 17-35. 4 Averroes, In Met. L.V., Comm. 14, f. 55 a 56. 4