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CONCERNING BEING AND ESSENCE 9 

It appears thus in the case of tastes, because sweetness is caused 
from the action of warmth dissolving moisture, and although 
in this mode the warmth is the cause of the sweetness, yet a 
body is not called sweet from its warmth but from the taste 
which unites both the warmth and the moisture. 

But because the principle of individuation is matter, it per- 
haps seems to follow from this that essence which unites in 
itself both matter and form would be only particular and not 
universal. From this it would follow that universals do not 
have definition, if essence is what is signified by means of the 
definition. One should therefore understand that matter in any 
mode whatsoever is not taken to be the principle of individua- 
tion, but only signaled matter (materia signata). And I call 
signaled matter that which is considered as under determinate 
dimensions. But now this matter is not posited in the defini- 
tion of man inasmuch as he is man, but it would be posited 
in the definition of Socrates if Socrates were to have a defini- 
tion. But in the definition of man non-signated matter is 
posited; for in the definition of man this certain flesh and this 
certain bone are not posited, bu\ bone and flesh absolutely, 
which are the non-signated matter of man. Accordingly, it is 
clear that the essence of Socrates and the essence of man do not 
differ except according to signate and non-signate. Whence the 
Commentator remarks upon the seventh of the Metaphysics 13 : 
"Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality which 
are his quiddity/' Thus also the essence of genus and of species 
differ according to signate and non-signate, although there is a 
different mode of designation for each of them, because the 
designation of the individual with respect to species is by 
means of matter determined by dimensions, whereas the desig- 
nation of species in respect to genus is by means of the consti- 
tutive difference which is take/i from the form of the thing. 

18 Avcrroes, In Met, VII, 5, comm. 20, f. 80 a 23.