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26 CONCERNING BEING AND ESSENCE means of which it subsists in the nature of things. And for this reason substances of this sort are said by some to be com- posed of that by virtue of which it is (quo esi) and that which it is (quod est), or of that which it is and existence, as Boethius says. 27 And since potency and act are posited in intelligences it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were no potency in them. Whence the Commentator says in the third book of the De Anlrna^ that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown we should not be able to discover multiplicity in separate sub- stances. Therefore the distinction of these in regard to one another is according to their grade (measure) of potency and act, so that a superior intelligence which is more proximate to the first (being) has more of act and less of potency, and so for others. And this is fulfilled in the human soul which holds the lowest grade among intellectual substances. Whence its possible intellect is disposed towards (se habet ad) intelligible forms just as first matter, which holds the lowest grade in sensible existence, is disposed towards sensible forms, as the Commentator remarks in book three on the De Animal And therefore the Philosopher 80 compares it to a tablet upon which nothing is written, and for this reason among other intelligible substances it has more potency. Accordingly, it is made to be so close to material things that the material thing is drawn to participate in its existence, so that from soul and body results one existence in one composite, although that existence accord- ing as it pertains to soul is not dependent upon the body. And therefore after that form which is in the soul are discovered 27 Boethius, DC Hcbd., PL, t. 64, col. 1311 C. 28 Avcrroes, In De An., Ill, com. 5, f. 118. 29 Averroes, In DC An., Ill, com. 5, p. 113 30 Aristotle, De An., Ill, 430 a i.