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PREFACE xxiii predicables: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. As such they are terms of discourse. In combination these make up a network of rationality by which entia naturae, beings of nature, are caught and expressed in the order of universals as univocal signs of many. Logic, strictly speaking, is the abstrac- tion and reflexive scrutiny of these modes of signification or terms of discourse. The second intention is the formal counter- part or analogue of a nature, an analytic composite which sup- plies the focus of analysis for synthetic natures. It is that by virtue of which what is known (the nature) is known. 2. In addition to the horizontal reference there is a vertical reference to the first intention which is an act of the mind signifying things themselves which are not signs of other things. Science deals with first intentions, but logic deals with second in- tentions. Herein lies the problem of the adequation or corn- mensuration of the intellect to the thing. Platonism is content to know the order of entia rationis, beings of the conceptual order, the ratios and sets of ratios, of formal reference in the horizontal plane. How these refer to entia naturae f beings of nature, namely, the individuated or terminated substance in nature remains a mystery. Platonism, then, stops short of the concrete universal or principle and is content to exploit the formal connectives of discourse at the expense of the terms connected. The Pythagorean reification of numbers, namely, that numbers are things, persists in the tradi- tion. Hence it is that Platonism studies mind as efficient cause primarily expressed in formal intuitions which furnish the ele- ments of structural forms. But the individuating cause in nature it fails to render intelligible. That anything is received into another thing according to the mode of the recipient remains in- explicable, but in Aristotelian abstraction the mode of the recipient is the crux of the doctrine. Abstraction explains the mode of recipiency in the order of