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*i PREFACE as a result of the recognition that science must possess a gen- eral method of procedure in regard to its subject matter, an instrument moreover which can be understood in some sense at least as a result of voluntary synthetic acts or syntactic opera- tions. This is an open concession to the Aristotelian truism that it is absurd to seek knowledge and at the same time the means for obtaining knowledge. Science consists of propositions about natural things, but it must so consist by means of an inde- pendent discipline which supplies it with dependable first prin- ciples. In addition it must explain the relation of rational modes to natural modes and how the former derive their being and truth from the latter if it desires to avoid mythology however empirical or rational. It is interesting if somewhat disquieting to watch the speculative psyche pass through its stages of re- capitulation. But I would not imply that the pragmatists have advanced to the stage of explaining the relationship of the sign to the thing signified. The De Ente et Essentia is a complete whole in itself in the sense that the axioms, definitions, postulates and initial theorems of Euclid constitute a whole. But even so the student may wel- come some extrinsic help, since the propositions refer beyond themselves to other texts and are referred to from other texts. The De Ente is in effect an argument matrix or doctrine function for the other Thomistic works. I believe that the most valuable assistance which this preface can offer is that of explaining and elucidating the principal concepts of the text. There are of course alternate routes by which such help may be conveyed, as for instance that of his- torical and comparative criticism joined to a scrutiny of genetic origins. But, again referring to Euclid, I observe that one might read all the foot-notes in Sir Thomas Heath's excellent edition, gathering thereby a vast quantum of assorted facts. Still it suffices to say that the information could have no genuine